We live an era of burgeoning neo-isolationism. This is not an original observation, but it is an important one. A decade and a half of war and conflict is the primarily catalyst for this philosophical retreat of the American socio-political mindset, and is not surprising given our traditional reluctance to engage too deeply in what some would term our "foreign adventures."
Much has been written about the purported decline of American influence in the world, the so-called failings of the benevolent American hegemony. Usually you find such conclusions written from the perch of left-leaning newsrooms or Ivy-league academia, the self-styled guardians of history and interpreters of events. The rise and fall of American prestige is typically laid at the feet of the occupant of the White House, and devolves less and less around policy than personality. That perceptions of American strength and popularity depend on the carefully crafted media façade surrounding any given administration is frightening, but any rational review of the way governments relate to one another prove that policy remains the primary driver behind diplomacy and international co-existence. If the American hegemony is indeed in retreat, we can lay the blame firmly at the feet of our collective failing in the diplomatic assertion of coherent principle, posture, and policy.
What's interesting about this neo-isolationist trend is that it is supported by an otherwise unlikely alliance of political foes - the die-hard libertarian and the leftist progressive. The former is all about individual liberty and freedom, while the latter is all about centralized control and management of society. Yet neither want a large footprint in foreign affairs beyond what is needed for basic trade and limited self-defense. One side wants to be left alone, the other wants to effectively rule or be ruled, both prefer to preoccupy themselves with themselves and leave the nations of the world to manage their own affairs and conflicts. And while our citizens and media alike turn their eyes inward, the maneuvering of governments continues apace, from Russia to Iran to China and beyond. I've long been preoccupied with Russia, somewhat less so with Iran, but until recently haven't concerned myself too greatly with China beyond the extreme discomfort that comes with the fact that China has the power to wreak chaos on our economy simply by calling in the loan on our massive national debt. But this fall, China began to extend their saber rattling beyond Taiwan into the broader Asian-Pacific region, and thus caught my renewed attention.
China and Japan have a long-running dispute over the territorial claims to a set of islands in what most call the East China Sea. In November, however, China asserted territorial rights to the airspace above those islands, extending far beyond internationally recognized boundaries. This move was disturbing in itself, but even more disturbing at first was what appeared to be a delay in American response. Why was an American response warranted? Because of our mutual protection treaty with Japan and other Asian-Pacific nations. But a few days later, in a response that both surprised and encouraged me, the U.S. flew two B-52 right down the center of that disputed airspace. The diplomatic message was decidedly mixed after that, but the military message was pretty clear. This whole episode drove me to pay closer attention to China's new adventurism. And I'm not the only one. Essays and articles are popping up everywhere,
especially with 2014 marking the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I. The overriding question: is history repeating itself?
In a post at Ricochet.com, military historian and professor Victor Davis Hanson discusses the parallels that may be at play in the ongoing chess match amidst the almost willful ignorance of conventional wisdom. I urge you to read the whole thing. A couple of excerpts worth examination (emphasis mine):
The tensions, however, continue and that invites historical analogies, most frequently to the calm before the unexpected storm of late 1914. Then also, Germany (read: China) believed its newfound power was not fairly appreciated by colonial Britain and France. America was isolationist and indifferent. The early 20th-century intelligentsia still believed that breakthrough technologies in communications and travel had created a new, interconnected world economy that no European power would be stupid enough to disrupt. Yet, supposedly, miscalculation, accident, and the unforeseen followed, triggering the nightmare of World War I— a war that no one really wanted.
In truth, wars rarely are caused by accident. Most nations know exactly what they are doing. While miscalculation can accelerate or retard the outbreak of a war, it is infrequently its primary cause. Instead, an absence of deterrence encourages adventurism, as aggressive powers are unsure of the relative strength (or the will to use it) of their rivals and thus believe they might gain an advantage by risking or even inviting war. War, then, becomes a sort of litmus test for verifying which nations or alliances of nations were the more powerful all along. Peace returns when such clarity is reestablished, as the weaker, defeated party accepts post-war subordination.
This is the danger of neo-isolationism. The appearance or perception of American retreat from the world stage, the failure to back up our traditional allies, the willingness to kowtow to the aspirations of our adversaries leads to confusion over who counts among the strong. Iran pushes forward because it can. Putin throws Russian influence around his neighbors because he can. Al Qaeda is reasserting itself across the Middle East because there is a vacuum to fill. China has an overly male and restless population, vast economic clout, and a vision of ascendancy to broaden the boundaries of its own hegemony. Is history repeating itself? Do the parallels suggested by various scholars regarding the present day have merit? (After all, I've seen our present situation compared to the 1970's and to the 1930's. Why not 1914?) To this end, Hanson concludes:
China may think it will own the late 21st century, but it needs to be reminded diplomatically (backed by displays of strength) that such a day is not yet here. A determined U.S. needs to send the message that any aggression against Japan would be met by solidarity among a number of nations, spearheaded by Washington. Only by reestablishing deterrence in the region can the democracies guide China away from the path of the Kaiser and the Japanese militarists of old—and remind it that reckless new powers that act precipitously beyond their capabilities usually end up badly.
Of course that's what should be done. The question is, do present and future administrations have the will to assert principle, posture, and policy in this arena, under these conditions? We can navel gaze about universal healthcare and entitlements forever, but the games of nations continues, and we ignore it to our peril.
I don't know that history repeats itself. I do know that throughout history, civilization demonstrates cycles. Powers rise and fall. Societies come together, thrive, come apart, flail, and come together again in new forms. War is always a part of these cycles. This is the pattern of human civilization. What drives modern scholars and historians to look to history for context to modern geopolitics? Are they simply looking for predictive models to judge current events, justification to drive current events, or simply the academic pursuit of discovery that ultimately concludes: "here we go again"?
I don't know. What I do know is that it is foolish to believe that a large regional conflict, or even world war, is outside the realm of possibility, even within our lifetimes. And yet it is equally foolish to believe that it is inevitable. One thing is sure: we must engage, or we will necessarily retreat.
